This paper provides quantitative assessment of two alternative explanations of interindustry wage di¤erentials: worker heterogeneity in the form of unobserved quality and …rm heterogeneity in the form of …rm's willingness to pay (WTP) for workers' productive attributes. We develop an empirical model of labor demand and apply a two-stage, nonparametric procedure to recover worker and …rm heterogeneity. In the …rst stage we recover the unmeasured worker quality by estimating a nonparametric hedonic wage function. In the second stage we infer each …rm's WTP parameters for worker attributes using …rst order conditions from the demand model. We apply our approach to quantify inter-industry wage di¤erentials using individual data from NLSY79 and …nd that worker quality accounts for approximately two-third of the inter-industry wage di¤erentials.
Introduction
Substantial evidence exists on large and persistent wage di¤erentials among industries for workers with the same observed productivity characteristics such as education and experience. The (unexplained) inter-industry wage di¤erentials have attracted the attention of economists for decades as they are used to examine the alternative theories of wage determination and the underlying forces of wage structural change. 1 Explanations for inter-industry wage di¤erentials largely fall into two categories. The …rst one emphasizes the role of the worker-speci…c productive abilities that are not measured in the data (Murphy and Topel, 1987) . The second one emphasizes the importance of …rm-speci…c heterogeneity in the form of compensating wage di¤erences (Rosen, 1986) , e¢ ciency wage (Katz, 1986; Krueger and Summers, 1988) , and rent sharing (Katz and Summers, 1989; Nickell and Wadhwani 1990 ). Gibbons and Katz (1992) provide empirical assessment of the two explanations by following a sample of (approximately) exogenously displaced workers but remain agnostic that either explanation alone can …t the empirical evidence on inter-industry wage di¤erentials.
There is continuing debate regarding how much the observed inter-industry wage di¤er-entials can be explained by the unobserved worker or …rm characteristics. To disentangle simultaneous worker-and …rm-level heterogeneity in wage determination, microdata matching characteristics of …rms to characteristics of their workers are preferred. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) are able to decompose inter-industry wage di¤erences in France into a worker …xed e¤ect and a …rm …xed e¤ect by using a large matched employer-employee panel data. However, such matched employer-employee panels are not frequently accessible to researchers.
In this paper, we develop an empirical model of labor demand and apply a two-stage, nonparametric procedure to recover unobserved worker and …rm heterogeneity in a hedonic wage equation. First, we recover unobserved worker quality nonparametrically using an estimator based on results from Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Imbens and Newey (2009) . This estimator exploits both the uniqueness of equilibrium wage function and its monotonicity in unobserved worker attributes to identify worker quality while allowing unobserved quality to be correlated with other observed worker characteristics such as education and experience. Second, we infer …rm-speci…c willingness to pay (WTP) with respect to both observed and unobserved worker attributes nonparametrically by using model results relating WTP and …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization. Once the unobserved worker and …rm e¤ects are identi…ed, we can quantitatively assess their importance in explaining inter-industry wage di¤erentials using widely available individual data.
Since the pioneer work of Rosen (1974) , hedonic models have been widely used in empirical literature. Our approach builds on the classic hedonic model and borrows insights from recent work on di¤erentiated product demand estimation in industrial organization. 2 We model labor demand as a discrete choice of a bundle of worker attributes. Worker quality is modeled as a worker attribute unobserved by the econometrician but valued by employers. Recent advances in industrial organization have proposed nonparametric methods to identify product characteristics observed by the consumers but not by the researcher (e.g., Bajari and Benkard 2005) . We apply these methods to recover worker quality. Similar to the hedonic literature, the marginal prices of worker characteristics are estimated as random coe¢ cients in a hedonic wage function. We use our estimates of worker and …rm e¤ects to analyze inter-industry wage di¤er-entials. Our labor demand model is estimated on individual data from NLSY79 to explore the importance of the two e¤ects in wage determination. Our estimates show that worker e¤ects are statistically more important than …rm e¤ects in explaining wages. This results is consistent with the …nding in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) using matched employeremployee panel data in France. We …nd unmeasured worker quality to account for about two-third of the inter-industry wage di¤erential.
Observed worker characteristics that are supposed to account for productivity di¤erences typically explain no more than 30 to 40 percent of the wage variations across workers. The existence of a large residual variance suggests di¤erences in unmeasured worker ability: high-ability worker earn high wages. In our empirical analysis, we …nd that the percentage of explained wage di¤erentials across workers nearly double when log wage regressions on observed worker attributes are augmented by the estimated unobserved worker quality. Large wage dispersion across employers is also consistent with ine¢ cient matching, indicating that worker reallocation may improve labor market e¢ ciency. Our empirical framework allows us to recover …rm's WTP for worker productive attributes, which may be interpreted as the match value between employers and employees. Variations in WTP for worker attributes across …rms of di¤erent industry a¢ liation imply that a reallocation of workers across …rms may increase match e¢ ciency. 2 Most of the hedonic literature considers a market with a continuum of products and perfect competition and all product characteristics are assumed to be perfectly observed. Rosen's estimation strategy is criticized by Brown and Rosen (1982) , Epple (1987) , and Bartik (1987) that preference estimates are biased because consumers with a strong preference for a product characteristic would purchase more of that characteristic. Recent work by Bajari and Benkard (2005) relaxes these assumptions and proposes a hedonic model of demand for di¤erentiated products which accounts for unobserved product characteristics and heterogeneous consumers. Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2004) and Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim (2010)also o¤er excellent discussion on the identi…cation issues in the estimation of hedonic models. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the hedonic labor demand model and discuss its properties. In section 3 we outline the estimation methods used to recover unobserved worker quality and employer preferences for worker attributes. In section 4 we describe the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses estimation results. Section 6 concludes and outlines possible extensions for future research. All derivations and auxiliary results can be found in the Appendixes.
A Model of Labor Demand
In this section we describe a labor demand model for heterogeneous workers. Consider an economy where labor markets are indexed by t = 1; :::; T: These markets are either a time series for a single labor market or a cross-section of markets. In each market there are j = 1; :::; J t workers and i = 1; :::; V t job vacancies. Each job vacancy is a single-worker …rm, which decides whether to hire a worker to …ll the vacancy.
Each worker is represented by a bundle of characteristics that potential employers value di¤erently, and M of the characteristics can be observed by both the employer and the researcher. Let X jt denote a 1 M vector of worker j 0 s observed characteristics. Examples of observed worker characteristics include education, work experience, and gender. We use a scalar jt to represent a characteristic of the worker that is observed only by the employer. The unobserved characteristic re ‡ects the fact that there are some worker attributes, such as productive abilities, communication skills, and career ambition, that are valued by the employer but are often not observed by the researcher. For simplicity, we interpret the variable jt as representing unmeasured worker quality that is rewarded in labor markets. The output produced by worker j at employer i in market t is given by the production function F i (E jt ; K it ); where E jt is the labor e¢ ciency units of worker j and K it is the composite non-labor input including all intermediate inputs and capital. The variable E jt measures the di¤erent skill levels of labor in terms of di¤erent quantities of e¢ ciency unit. 3 We denote the set of available labor e¢ ciency units at time t by t fE 0t ; E 1t ; :::; E Jtt g; where E 0t represents no hiring.
Employers are pro…t maximizers that choose labor input E jt and non-labor input K it , given market wage rate w jt , rental price r it of non-labor input K it ; and output price p it . Formally, employer i's problem is
where the production function F i (E jt ; K it ) is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in K it : The …rst order condition on K it implicitly de…nes a unique employer-speci…c optimal choice of the composite non-labor input, given its rental price, an labor e¢ ciency level, and the output price.
Replacing the optimal choice of non-labor input in (1), the employer's problem simpli…es to choose an optimal labor input E jt :
where R it (E jt ) is the employer-speci…c revenue per worker net of non-labor costs, i.e.,
We model a worker's labor e¢ ciency units as a function of her characteristics such that E jt = E(X jt ; jt ). Then the employer's decision becomes a discrete-choice problem of choosing at most one worker to maximize pro…t on the job vacancy: max j2f0;1;:::;Jtg it (X jt ; jt ) = R it (X jt ; jt ) w jt :
If more than one worker generates the same pro…ts for the employer, we assume the employer would randomly pick one to …ll the vacancy. The option of not hiring is denoted by j = 0:
In the heterogeneous labor demand model outlined above, there is a unique equilibrium wage function w t (X jt ; jt ) in each market t, mapping the set of worker characteristics onto the set of wages. The equilibrium wages have the following properties: (1) there is one wage for each bundle of worker characteristics; (2) the wage function is increasing in the unobserved worker quality. The following proposition establishes these results.
Proposition 1 Suppose that R it (X jt ; jt ) is (i) Lipschitz continuous in (X jt ; jt ) and (ii) strictly increasing in jt ; for all employers i = 1; :::; V t , then there exists a unique, Lipschitzcontinuous equilibrium wage function w t (X jt ; jt ) that is strictly increasing in jt for each market t:
The proof is provided in Appendix A. 4 Suppose that worker characteristic m; denoted by x c j;m;t ; is a continuous variable and that worker j is pro…t maximizing for employer i: Then the following …rst-order conditions must hold:
Thus a …rm's optimal labor demand will be one at which the value the …rm derives from the last unit of each worker characteristic is exactly equal to the implicit price it had to pay for that unit. If this were not so then the …rm could increase their pro…ts by choosing an alternative worker with di¤erent bundle of worker attributes. Some restrictions on the revenue per worker function R it (X jt ; jt ) will be required for identi…cation. We assume this function to be linear in (X jt ; jt ) with …rm-speci…c coe¢ cients, that is,
Given this functional form assumption, the employer's problem in Equation (16) 
The …rm's …rst-order conditions in Equations (6) and (7) on any continuous characteristic 
i;
While seemingly arbitrary, the linearity assumption in Equation (8) can be derived under mild conditions on model primitives. 5 In what follows, we illustrate how the linear revenue function can be derived from common speci…cations of labor e¢ ciency and the production 5 The proposed functional form is not required for identi…cation. Other parametric speci…cations could be considered, such as a linear function where continuous variables are in logarithms rather than in levels (e.g., Bajari and Benkard 2005, Bajari and Khan 2005). We tried this latter speci…cation, but its performance on explaining inter-industry wage di¤erentials was not signi…cantly di¤erent than the linear-in-levels speci…cation used in this paper. The linear-in-levels case has the advantage of clear interpretation of i as WTP vector for worker characteristics, so we focus our analysis on this speci…cation. function. We suppress the market subindex t in our notation for ease of exposition.
Consider the following speci…cation for labor e¢ ciency units of worker j with characteristics vector x j;1 ; x j;2 ; ; x j;M ; j ; E j = 0 + 1 x j;1 + 2 x j;2 + + M x j;M + j ; 8j = 1; :::; J:
In addition, consider a CES production function
where i governs the income shares between labor and non-labor inputs, and i determines the elasticity of substitution between inputs. The …rst-order condition of the employer's problem with respect to K i implies that its optimal demands takes the form of
Pro…t from hiring worker j; given the optimal choice of non-labor input, becomes
Therefore, under the CES assumption, the employer's problem simpli…es to i = max j2f0;1;:::;J)
where the pro…t of not hiring (j = 0) is equal to zero. Intuitively, i represents the dollar value of the marginal productivity of labor e¢ ciency units for employer i. Under the model primitives, this coe¢ cient is given by
Combining Equations (12) and (16) gives a parametric form of the revenue per worker function,
where the coe¢ cient vector i is the product of the vector of e¢ ciency unit coe¢ cients in Equation (12) 
Estimation of the Labor Demand Model
The equilibrium pricing function implied by most hedonic models is of the nonseparable form Y = g(X; "), where Y is the product price, X is a vector of observed characteristics, and " is a variable representing unobserved attributes. Our equilibrium wage function also consists of a functional where X and " are nonseparable. 6 A large body of literature examines the estimation and identi…cation of both the function g(:) and the unobserved term " (e.g. Our estimation strategy proceeds in two steps. In the …rst step, we recover the unobserved worker quality up to a normalization using nonparametric methods based on the identi…-cation results of Matzkin (2003) . 7 To take into account the potential correlation between worker quality and other observed worker characteristics, we use an extended version of the estimators proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Imbens and Newey (2009) . In the second step, we use the …rst-order conditions in Equations (10) and (11) to infer …rm-speci…c parameters on their WTP for continuous worker characteristics.
Estimation of Unobserved Worker Quality
Since unobserved worker quality has no inherent units, we normalize jt to lie in the interval [0; 1] by using a monotonic transformation F ( jt ), where F ( jt ) is the cumulative distrib- 6 Chernozukov and Hansen (2005, p. 248) motivate their IV model of quantile treatment e¤ects with a returns-to-training model whose variables have an interpretation similar to ours. 7 Matzkin (2003) demonstrates that the unobserved component " in a nonlinear function Y = m(X; ") is only identi…ed up to a normalization. ution function (cdf) of jt : For the case where observed characteristics X jt are uncorrelated with jt , Bajari and Benkard (2005) show that F ( jt ) = F wjx (w jt jX jt ), where F wjx (:j:) denotes the cdf of wages conditional on worker characteristics. In the context of the labor demand model we consider, however, observable worker characteristics such as education and experience are likely correlated with the unobserved worker quality. To confront the endogeneity problem, we develop an estimator in the spirit of Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Imbens and Newey (2009) .
A control variable V is a variable such that X and " are independent conditional on V: Our …rst step of estimation builds on recent estimators that condition on control variables as an alternative to traditional IV estimators to deal with endogenous regressors (e.g. 
where m is an error term such that ( ; 1 ; :::; M 0 ) are jointly independent of (X 1 ; Z); and each h m (:) is an unknown function strictly increasing in m : The following proposition shows that ( 1 ; :::; M 0 ) are control variables that can be used in the estimation of the unobserved worker quality after a normalization. The unobserved worker quality can be recovered in three steps. First, for each endogenous variable indexed by m = 1; :::; M 0 , we estimate the values of m using an empirical analog of F x 0m jX 1 ;Z (:j:): Second, we use the recovered series for m to nonparametrically estimate F wjx; (:j:); the integrand function in Equation (20) . Third, the estimates of worker quality are obtained by integrating out using Halton draws of the M 0 -dimensional unit cube. 9 The same procedure is applied to all workers j = 1; :::; J t and markets t = 1; :::; T:
Over the past few decades, a number of nonparametric methods, such as kernel method and series estimators, have been proposed to estimate conditional cdf. Imbens and Newey (2009) document that series estimators are preferable in empirical frameworks similar to ours. Within the class of series estimators, the mixtures of normal distributions are a frequently used nonparametric estimator (e.g., Bajari, Fox and Ryan, 2007; Bajari et al. 2011) because of its desirable approximation and consistency properties (e.g., Norets 2010). For our application, we have adopted this type of estimator as it …ts the data well and is computationally more tractable for the numeric integration in Equation (20) than other methods.
More speci…cally, our estimator for the conditional probability distribution function (pdf)
f of a variable Y; given a 1 H vector of covariates U , is a weighted mixture of normal densitiesf
where R(N ) represents the (integer) number of normal densities as an (increasing) function of sample size N , is the vector of parameters of the density function, and (:j r ; r ) is a normal density with mean r and standard deviation r . The corresponding conditional cdf of Y isF
where (:j r ; r ) denotes the cdf of the same normal distribution: Each normal density in Equation (21) is weighted by a multinomial logit function r (U; ) with a (H + 1) 1 9 Halton draws consist of a sequence of numbers within the unit interval that uses a prime number as its base (Halton 1960) . For example, the …rst 8 numbers in the sequence corresponding to base 3 are 1/3, 2/3, 1/9, 4/9, 7/9, 2/9, 5/9, 8/9. To span the domain of the M 0 -dimensional unit cube it su¢ ces to form Halton draws using di¤erent prime numbers for each dimension. Its advantages over random draws from U 
Norets (2010) demonstrates that this speci…cation approximates arbitrarily well the true conditional pdf of Y given U .
In each market t = 1; :::; T; our maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for the pdf of an endogenous attribute x 0;m conditional on exogenous worker characteristics X and an instrument set Z is de…ned aŝ Our maximum likelihood estimator for the pdf of wages conditional on observed worker attributes X and control variables iŝ
After obtaining estimates of^ x 0;m for each m = 1; :::; M 0 , the corresponding estimate for the control variable value for each worker j in market t is m;j;t =F x 0;m jX 1 ;Z (x 0;m;j;t jX 1;j;t ; Z jt ;^ x 0;m ): With control variable estimates of m;j;t for all m,^ w is obtained by solving Equation (25) . Then we can estimate the unobserved quality of each worker j in market t by using Equation (20) , and we have^
Estimation of Firm WTP Parameters
The …rm's labor demand problem described in Equation (5) is characterized by the revenue per worker function R i (X j ; j ); which can be derived from given model primitives on 10 We need to select R(N ) in order to obtain estimates of distribution parameters. This is analogous to the selection of smoothing parameters of other nonparametric estimators such as kernels or local linear regressions. Following Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Khan (2005) , among others, we guide our choice by visual inspection of the estimates. Our starting point for choosing the number of normal distribution in the mixture is R(N ) = int( p N=2);a rule of thumb proposed by Mardia, Kent and Bibby (1979). labor e¢ ciency and the production function. We consider a revenue per worker function R(X j ; j ; i ) that is linear in i .
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Equation (10) suggests that if we could recover an estimate of @w t (X j t ; j t )=@x c j;m;t ; then we could learn a …rm's random coe¢ cient or WTP for worker characteristic m. In our micro data, we do observe the worker characteristics employed by each …rm. We can ‡exibly estimate @w t (X j t ; j t )=@x c j;m;t by using nonparametric methods. After we recover the unobserved worker quality, we can estimate a …rm's WTP for unobserved quality based on @w t (X j t ; j t )=@ jt :
A practical, ‡exible way to quantify wage function derivatives at each point in the data is to apply local linear regression methods to data on wages, observed worker attributes and unobserved quality estimates. Bajari and Khan (2005) also resort to this approach to estimate the hedonic price function and quantify derivatives of this function. However, two important di¤erences apply. First, they assume that is independent of all observed characteristics X: While this is an acceptable assumption in their housing demand model, it is not reasonable for our application due to endogeneity concerns about schooling and experience. Second, their direct application of local linear regression to housing data does not separate the derivative @w t (X j t ; j t )=@ jt from the value of jt . We separate the two values by …rst quantifying unobserved worker skill using the methods described above, and then treat the estimated values of j;t as an extra regressor for local linear regression.
Speci…cally, for a given t; the wage function at each data observation j 2 f1; :::; J t g (locally) satis…es the equation w j ;t = b j ;0 + b j ;1 x j ;1;t + ::: + b ;j ;M x j ;M;t + b j j ;t ; (27) where each coe¢ cient b j ;m represents the derivative of w with respect to characteristic m at point j . Intuitively, this corresponds to the fact that, by a …rst-order Taylor expansion argument, a function w at point (X j t ; j t ) is well approximated by a tangent hyperplane in a neighborhood of the function value at that point, w j t :
12
In the context of nonparametric regression, Fan and Gijbels (1996) provide a formula for the coe¢ cients in Equation (27) for each observation j . Denote the J t 1 vector of all wages by w t and the vector stacking all coe¢ cients by b j ; the solution to the latter is
11 Recall that this assumption nests the simple speci…cations on labor e¢ ciency in Equation (12) and the CES production function in Equation (13) as especial cases. 12 See Judd (1998) and Fan and Gijbels (1996) for a discussion.
where Z t and t are matrices de…ned as 
K h (z t ) is a multivariate kernel function with smoothing parameter vector h; and we let K h be the product of M + 1 standard normal densities. Similar to other practical application of local linear regression with several covariates, the bandwidth vector h is selected by visual inspection of estimates. 13 As the values of b j are estimates of the derivatives of the wage function, they consist also of estimates to the values of i for continuous attributes implied by our linear pro…t speci…-cation. This allows us to recover the unobserved, …rm-speci…c WTP parameters i;x c j;m;t : For worker characteristics that take on discrete values, point identi…cation of random coe¢ cients on these characteristics cannot be achieved by using …rst-order conditions similar to Equation (10) . Instead, we can only establish bound estimates for these coe¢ cients using the condition that …rm i's choice of the discrete characteristic observed in the data maximizes pro…t in Equation (??). To illustrate this point, suppose that …rm i hires worker j . Let X i and X i denote the vectors of observed characteristics with f emale = 1 and f emale = 0, respectively, and all other elements equal to the corresponding observed attributes in vector X j . The implicit price faced by employer i for a female worker is then w t (X i ; j t ) w t ( X i ; j t ): Denote i;f as the coe¢ cient for female dummy in the revenue function. Pro…t maximization problem in Equation (??) implies that i;f > w t (X i ; j t ) w t ( X i ; j t ) if worker j is female, and i;f w t (X i ; j t ) w t ( X i ; j t ) otherwise. That is, if employer i hires a female worker, then we can infer that i's WTP for this characteristic exceeds the implicit price for this characteristic. 14 A …rm's WTP for a discrete worker characteristic is not point identi…ed even if the researcher is willing to assume a parametric distribution for the parameter. This lack of point identi…cation precludes the usage of …rm WTP for discrete attributes in our statistical 13 Fan and Gijbels (1996) provide aymptotically optimal methods for bandwidth choice, yet for applications with several covariates such as ours this approach may not be reliable. Relying bandwidth choice on …t quality heuristics is as reasonable here as in related work where local linear regression is also used (e.g. Bajari and Khan 2005, Bajari and Benkard 2005). 14 Bajari and Khan (2005) provide a similar example in the context of their hedonic housing demand model where similar identi…cation concerns arise. Thus, the lack of point identi…cation of WTP for discrete attributes is an issue that our framework has in common with other approaches of the hedonic model literature.
work on inter-industry wage di¤erentials. So we will focus on …rm WTP on continuous attributes including education, work experience and unobserved worker quality. 15 
Data
The micro data in our empirical analysis come from the 1990 and 1993 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were …rst surveyed in 1979. The NLSY79 data contain rich information on employment and demographic characteristics. For each individual, the NLSY79 reports age, gender, race, education, marital status, region of current residence, employment status, occupation, and earnings. In addition, the NLSY79 ask questions on individual background and employer characteristics. We have information on parental education, AFQT score, industry a¢ liation, and …rm size.
Data on individuals'usual earnings (inclusive of tips, overtime, and bonuses but before deductions) have been collected during every survey year on the …rst …ve jobs since the last interview date in NLSY79. Combining the amount of earnings with information on the applicable unit of time, e.g. per hour, per day, per week, etc., an hourly wage rate was collected. The earnings variable used in this paper is the hourly wage for the job identi…ed as the CPS job, i.e., current or the most recent job. We consider hourly wage less than $1.00 and greater than $250.00 to be outliers and eliminate them from the sample.
We construct the work experience variable from the week-by-week NLSY79 Work History Data. Usual hours worked per week at all jobs are available beginning January 1, 1978. Annual hours are computed by aggregating weekly hours in each calendar year. An individual accumulates one year of experience if she works for at least 1,000 hours a year. We restrict our sample to those with complete history of work experience. The sample we analyze contains 4,266 observations from the 1990 survey and 3,522 observations from the 1993 survey.
We use our NLSY data to estimate a standard cross-section Mincer wage equation to examine the importance of industry a¢ liation in explaining wage variance. Columns (1) and (5) of Table 1 report raw di¤erences in log hourly wages by industry, for both the 1990 and 1993 observations. These are computed from cross-section regressions of log wage on a set of 15 In an attempt to remedy for the lack of point identi…cation of WTP for discrete attributes, we have tried to estimate the mean WTP for gender, race and marital status conditional on …rm characteristics assuming a probit speci…cation, as in Bajari and Khan (2005) . We then use the estimated mean WTP in lieu of the true WTP in our statistical work on wage di¤erentials. Not only the conditional means are statistically insigni…cant, but they jointly explained less than 1% of wage variation in the wage regressions discussed below. For this reason and for the sake of exposition, we focus our analysis on WTP for continuous characteristics.
industry dummy variables using one digit Census Industry Classi…cation (CIC) Codes. 16 We use two cross-section wage observations so that we can check the consistency of our results over time and across di¤erent points in the career path. A simple summary measure of the importance of industry coe¢ cients is their standard deviation. We report both unweighted and weighted standard deviations of the industry coe¢ cient estimates. The unweighted standard deviation measures the di¤erence in wages between a randomly chosen industry and the average industry, while the weighted standard deviation (by employment) measures the di¤erence in wages between a worker in a given industry and the average worker. There is substantial variation in wages across industries. In Columns (2) and (6) we examine the extent to which the raw inter-industry wage di¤erentials persist once the usual human capital controls are added. Our strategy is to control for worker characteristics as well as possible, and then analyze the e¤ects of the industry dummy variables. We estimate industry wage di¤erentials from the cross-section wage function
where w is the logarithm of the hourly wage; X is a vector of individual attributes, D is a vector of industry dummy variables, and " is a random error term. The controls are education, age, sex, race, marital status, 4 location dummies, union status, veteran status, and several interaction terms. The industry dummy variables are statistically signi…cant in both years, 17 substantial in magnitude, and quite similar to those estimated with other data sets (e.g. Blackburn and Neumark, 1992; Krueger and Summers, 1988) using data from the 1970s and 1980s. Earnings in construction, mining, transportation, communication and public utilities, for example, are substantially greater than those in wholesale and retail trade and service industries, even with controls for years of schooling, potential experience, gender, race, etc. The addition of human capital controls reduces inter-industry wage di¤erentials, as measured by their standard deviation, by 8-10% in 1990 and 15-20% in 1993. Even after including various human capital controls, the coe¢ cient estimates on industry dummies in Equation (31) may pick up the unobserved worker quality di¤erences across industries. Previous research has attempted to correct unobserved quality bias in estimated industry e¤ects by including proxies of worker quality such as test scores in wage regressions (Blackburn and Neumark, 1992). In Columns (3) and (7), we include the AFQT scores as additional independent variables in the wage equations. Compared with the estimates from Columns (2) and (6), the standard deviations of the industry e¤ects fall slightly for both the 1990 (from 0.136 to 0.133, unweighted) and the 1993 regressions (from 0.115 to 0.114, unweighted). Furthermore the inclusion of parental education in the wage regressions has little e¤ect on the standard deviations of the industry e¤ects, as shown in Columns (4) and (8) of Table 1 . These results appear to provide no support for the unobserved quality explanation of industry wage di¤erentials, consistent with the conclusion reached by Blackburn and Neumark (1992).
Another approach to address the problem of unobserved labor quality is by analyzing longitudinal data and by estimating …rst di¤erence speci…cation of wage equations (Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Murphy and Topel, 1987a, 1987b ). When we pool the 1990 and 1993 samples, 877 of the workers report changes in their one digit industry from 1990 to 1993. Column (9) of Table 1 reports the …rst di¤erence estimates of the wage regression. The industry variables are jointly signi…cant. For example, the …rst di¤erence results show that workers who join the construction sector gain a 23.1 percent pay increase. These results are consistent with the …ndings by Krueger and Summers (1988) , and they interpret them as evidence that di¤erences in labor quality cannot explain inter-industry wage di¤erentials. 18 One potential problem with using test scores and family background as proxies to remove omitted-quality bias is that test scores and family background are only partly correlated with the types of ability that are rewarded in labor markets. The ability to do well in standard tests may be very di¤erent from the motivation and perseverance necessary to succeed in the workplace. On the other hand, the …rst-di¤erence estimates rely on the assumption that unobserved quality is time invariant and equally rewarded in all industries, and therefore it can be di¤erenced out as individual …xed e¤ect. If labor quality evolves over time, perhaps though learning, and it is valued di¤erently by industries, then individual …xed e¤ect can no longer capture its e¤ect on wages. Therefore, we cannot conclude from Table 1 that interindustry wage di¤erentials are not attributable to variation in unobserved labor quality.
Empirical Results
In this section we present estimates of our hedonic labor demand model. We …rst outline estimation results for the unobserved worker quality recovered in our …rst stage estimation. Then we present …rm WTP distribution estimates based on our model speci…cation. Fi-nally we assess how much the unobserved worker quality and …rm WTP to education, work experience and quality can account for the inter-industry wage di¤erentials.
Unobserved Worker Quality
We use NLSYdata on wages and observed worker characteristics to estimate unobserved worker quality using Equation (26) . Our approach is ‡exible enough to allow the unobserved worker quality to evolve over time and allow …rm to reward both observed and unobserved worker quality di¤erently. The variables of observed worker characteristics, represented by the vector X, include years of schooling, experience, and dummy variables on gender, race and marital status. Out of these variables, years of schooling and experience are potentially correlated with unobserved worker quality. We include them in the sub-vector X 0 and the other observed characteristics in the sub-vector X 1 . Table 2 shows the joint distribution between some of the observed worker characteristics and the worker quality. As for the worker attributes on human capital, we …nd that both average worker quality increases in educational attainment, work experience and AFQT scores. Across industries, we also observe substantial di¤erences in average worker quality, with transportation and public utilities, …nance, and construction have higher average worker quality than wholesale and retail trade and services. Table 3 reports correlations between the estimated quality and human capital variables in each year. The correlations of these variables are positive but relatively low; all six correlations are less than 0.40. In particular, the correlations between the estimated quality and AFQT score are 0.361 and 0.352 in 1990 and 1993, respectively. These estimates imply that worker quality rewarded in labor markets may not re ‡ect in the AFQT score. Therefore explicitly incorporating AFQT scores into wage regressions cannot fully account for variations in unobserved worker quality across industries. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the correlation between the quality estimates in 1990 and 1993 to be fairly high at 0.712. Although worker quality is highly persistent, it is by no means …xed over time according to our estimates. Thus standard …rst-di¤erence estimators cannot account for the unobserved quality. Our estimates indicate that worker quality becomes more correlated with experience over time, which may be explained by the theory of learning-by-doing.
Distributions of WTP Parameters
For both years, we estimate the structural model of labor demand presented in Section 2. This yields for each …rm, a WTP parameter for schooling, experience and unobserved worker quality, respectively. We present histograms of WTP parameters for these attributes for the 1990 and 1993 …rms, respectively, with the estimated kernel densities. In each …gure, we plot the distribution of WTP parameters for …rms across all industries, followed by the distribution of the same parameters in each one-digit industry. There appears to be large variation in WTP for both observed education and experience and unobserved worker quality. All the distributions are right-skewed and are not normally distributed.
Panel A of Figure 1 presents the histogram of …rm-speci…c WTP for one year of education in all industries in 1990. The distribution has a long right tail, with a mean of 15.4 and a standard deviation of 4.7. Panels B to H present the histograms of …rm WTP for education in each one-digit industry. Finance, insurance and real estate industry has the highest mean WTP for education at 16.3, while the mining industry has the lowest mean WTP for education of 14.5. All industry-speci…c distributions are right-skewed. More speci…cally, the distribution in the services industry has the longest tail with a standard deviation of 5.0, and the distribution in the construction industry is least dispersed with a standard deviation of 4.2. Figure 2 present the histograms of …rm-speci…c WTP for work experience in all industries in Panel A, and in each one-digit industry in Panels B to H. The average WTP for a year of work experience (6.3) is lower than the average WTP for a year of education (15.4), but WTP for experience is more dispersed with a standard deviation of 6.1. Firms in the …nance, insurance and real estate industry and the services industry value work experience most, with a mean WTP of 6.9, while experience is least valued in the construction industry with a mean WTP of 5.5. In terms of dispersion, the services industry has the longest right tail, and the distribution of WTP for experience is most concentrated in the mining industry.
Firm-speci…c WTP for worker quality in all industries and in each one-digit industry in 1990 are presented in Figure 3 . As worker quality has no intrinsic units and is normalized between 0 and 1. The values of WTP parameters for quality are not important and we will focus on their relative level across industries. The distribution of WTP for worker quality in Panel A appears to be bimodal. This is due to the fact that most …rms in some industry (e.g. mining) do not value worker quality as much whereas a majority of …rms in other industry (e.g. …nance, insurance and real estate) derive much higher value for worker quality. The two modes in the distributions in the construction and the services industries also contribute to the overall bimodal distribution. Based on Panels B to H, the (unobserved) worker quality is less valuable to …rms in mining, construction, and wholesale and retail trade industries compared to …rms in …nance, insurance and real estate, services, and transportation, communication and public utilities industries. Similar to the distribution of WTP for education, the distribution of WTP for quality is most dispersed in the services industry and least dispersed in the construction industry.
Similarly we present the distributions of WTP for education, work experience, and worker quality from 1993 in Figure 4 to 6. Firms in all industries value education more in 1993 compared to 1990. The 1993 distributions of WTP for education in Figure 4 are also more dispersed than the 1990 distributions in Figure 1 , and they show two modes. Likewise, Figure  6 shows that …rms in all industries value worker quality more, and the distributions of WTP to quality are more dispersed in 1993. These results are consistent with the increasing return to both education and unobserved ability documented in the literature. On the contrary, work experience is less valued by …rms, and …rms'valuation on experience is less dispersed in 1993, as indicated by the lower mean and variance of WTP parameters in Figure 5 relative to those in Figure 2 .
Firm WTP across workers'human capital attributes are not independently distributed. Table 4 reports, in each year, the correlation matrix of WTP across worker attributes on education, experience and quality. In both years, …rm WTP for all human capital attributes have strong positive correlation with each other.
Inter-industry Wage Di¤erentials
Columns (2) and (6) of Table 5 present estimates of coe¢ cients in Equation (31) by adding recovered worker quality as additional control variable in the 1990 and 1993 cross-section wage regressions. For comparison, Columns (1) and (5) report the same estimates with all controls including AFQT scores and family background, but without estimated quality. The coe¢ cient on worker quality is large and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients on industry dummies declined and many of them become statistically insigni…cant after worker quality is included. The standard deviation of the unweighted inter-industry wage di¤erentials decreases by 82% from 0.133 to 0.024 in 1990 and by 90% from 0.114 to 0.011 in 1993. The weighted standard deviation of wage di¤erentials fall by a similar magnitude. In addition, the adjusted R 2 of the log wage regression increase from 0.356 to 0.861 in 1990 and from 0.376 to 0.857 in 1993. These results suggest that the unmeasured worker quality is an important driving force of inter-industry wage di¤erentials and overall wage dispersion. Columns (3) and (7) of Table 5 present estimates of coe¢ cients in equation (31) by adding recovered …rm WTP as additional control variables. The industry wage premiums in both years become smaller in size, but stay signi…cant. The standard deviation of the unweighted inter-industry wage di¤erentials decreases from 0.133 to 0.122 in 1990 and barely changes in 1993. The adjusted R 2 of the log wage regression increased slightly from 0.356 to 0.390 in 1990. Compared to worker quality (columns 2 and 6), …rm WTP can only account for a small portion of the inter-industry wage di¤erentials and overall wage dispersion. When both worker quality and …rm WTP are included in the OLS wage regression in columns (4) and (8), the standard deviations of industry wage di¤erentials almost stay the same as in the regressions that only control for worker quality. We further decompose the contribution of worker heterogeneity and …rm heterogeneity to observed inter-industry wage di¤erentials by using the estimated worker quality and …rm WTP. First, we estimate inter-industry wage di¤erentials by regressing (31) with two-digit industry dummies. Then we regress the estimated industry wage premiums on recovered average worker quality at the industry level. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that unobserved worker quality alone can account for approximately two-third of the observed inter-industry wage di¤erentials in both years. When we regress industry wage premium with …rm WTP parameters in column (2), their explanatory power on industry premiums is relatively low in 1990, but higher in 1993. Combining worker quality and …rm WTP in column (3), they can account for close to 80% of the overall variations in inter-industry wage premiums in both years.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose an alternative approach to explain inter-industry wage di¤erentials by recovering unobserved worker skill from an hedonic model of labor demand. The model allows nonparametric identi…cation of unobserved worker skill as well as employer-speci…c WTP for worker attributes. Our approach does not require the usage of matched employeremployee panels to disentangle the worker e¤ect and the …rm e¤ect in inter-industry wage di¤erentials. Instead, we can rely on widely available household or individual micro data sets. Using data from NLSY79, we …nd that unmeasured worker quality accounts for most of inter-industry wage di¤erentials.
An important caveat to the e¤ect of …rm WTP on industry wage premiums is that the hedonic labor demand model does not point identify employer-speci…c WTP for discrete worker characteristics, such as gender, race or marital status, even if the researcher poses strong assumptions about the distribution of WTP parameters. This is a feature that our framework shares with other related models (e.g. Bajari and Benkard 2005, Bajari and Khan 2005). We are therefore unable to identify what portion of inter-industry wage di¤erentials can be explained by WTP for discrete attributes. Finding a set of mild assumptions that could point-identify employer WTP for discrete attributes is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is left for future research.
As in the hedonic model of di¤erentiated product proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) , supply-side assumptions on worker behavior are not required in our model. An interesting extension to our framework is to explicitly model labor supply behavior and allow workers to choose which …rm to work for. In such an equilibrium model, one may separately identify compensating di¤erences from WTP parameters, but it involves various challenges in identi…cation (Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim 2004, Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim 2010).
Appendix A:
Proof of Proposition 1
To show Proposition 1, it su¢ ces to demonstrate that for any two workers j and j 0 employed in market t, three conditions hold:
(1) If X jt = X j 0 t and jt = j 0 t then w jt = w j 0 t . (2) If X jt = X j 0 t and jt > j 0 t then w jt > w j 0 t : (3) jw jt w j 0 t j M (jX jt X j 0 t j + j jt j 0 t j) for some M < 1: Suppose w jt > w j 0 t for some market t in which both workers j and j 0 are employed and X jt = X j 0 t and jt = j 0 t : Then R it (X jt ; jt ) w jt < R it (X j 0 t ; j 0 t ) w j 0 t for all employers i = 1; :::; V t . This implies that no one would hire worker j in market t, which is a contradiction. Suppose w jt w j 0 t for some market t in which both workers j and j 0 are employed and X jt = X j 0 t and jt > j 0 t : Since R it (X jt ; jt ) is strictly increasing in jt ; it follows that R it (X jt ; jt ) w jt > R it (X j 0 t ; j 0 t ) w j 0 t for all employers i = 1; :::; V t . This implies that no one would hire worker j 0 in market t, which is a contradiction.
The assumption that R it (X jt ; jt ) is Lipschitz continuous in (X jt ; jt ) implies that, for any two workers j and j 0 di¤ering in at least one characteristic,
for some M < 1:
Assume without loss of generality that w jt > w j 0 t ; then the second term on the right hand side, w jt w j 0 t , is positive. Since the demand for worker j is positive, the …rst term must be positive for some employer i: For these employers, we can ignore the absolute sign.
Therefore, w jt w j 0 t M (jX jt X j 0 t j + j jt j 0 t j) for employer i that prefers j to j 0 :
Here we use the fact that both workers have positive demand to limit how much their wages can vary.
Proof of Proposition 2:
First, we use the assumption that each function h m (:; m ) is strictly monotonic in m to de…ne h 
where (34) follows from the monotonicity assumption, (35) follows from the independence between (X 1 ; Z) and = ( 1 ; :::; M 0 ), and (36) is a result of normalizing m so that it follows an U [0; 1]):
We now show that the vector consists of control variables such that X and are independent conditional on . Adapting the proof of Theorem 1 of Imbens and Newey (2009) for multivariate X 0 , for any bounded function a(x 0 ; x 1 ), it follows from the independence of (X 1 ; Z) and ( ; ) that
Thus, for any bounded function b( ), it follows from law of iterated expectations that
which means by de…nition independence between X and conditional on . Finally, given that both each m are normalized such that each follow a U [0; 1]; for each market t and worker j we have
where we exploited the fact that the equilibrium wage function is strictly monotonic in :
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